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Abstract: We live in the age of apology, particularly the age of collective apology. Here, I focus 
specifically on collective state apologies. In these apologies, political leaders apologize on behalf 
of an entire collective to another collective, often a racial or ethnic minority. Cynicism and 
skepticism arise on whether these apologies are morally legitimate. Here, moral legitimacy 
entails that an apology deserves to be given the authority, seriousness, and consideration that 
interpersonal apologies usually demand. In this paper, I respond to two groups that doubt the 
moral legitimacy of such apologies, namely political-realists and moral-individualists. 
Ultimately, I argue that collective state apologies can be morally legitimate. Political-realists are 
wrong to think that sincerity is necessary or sufficient for moral legitimacy. Moral-individualists 
overmoralize the role of the individual to the point of “hyperindividualism.” I end by proposing 
that at least democratically elected leaders have standing to apologize on behalf of their 
constituents. 
 
















 It has been said that we live in the “age of apology,”1 particularly the age of the collective 
apology. Governments, state leaders, and even large corporations across the globe have extended 
apologies — and in some cases, even compensation — to communities that have suffered abuse 
and injustice.2 In this article, I focus on collective state apologies.  Collective state apologies are 
cases in which political leaders apologize on behalf of an entire collective group to another 
collective group, often a racial or ethnic minority. There are numerous examples of these types 
of apologies and their growth shows no sign of slowing down.3  
 At first glance, these apologies seem puzzling. When one thinks of apologies, one usually 
thinks of interpersonal apologies. Because of this, many worries might arise regarding collective 
state apologies. These worries include but are not limited to,4 whether the political leaders 
extending these apologies are being sincere5, and how these political leaders have standing to 
 
1 This  phrase comes from Mark Gibney’s book, The Age of Apology: Facing up to the Past (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
2 Graham Dodds, a political science professor at Concordia University, counts 47 national apologies between 1993 
and 1997 but 146 apologies between 1998 and 2002: http://www.upenn.edu/pnc/politicalapologies.html. Also, 
Aaron Lazare, professor of psychiatry, identifies 1,193 articles with the themes “apology” or “apologize” in The 
Washington Post and The New York Times. Between 1998 - 2002, the number increased to 2,203 articles.  Aaron 
Lazare, On Apology (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
3 Here are just some examples of collective state apologies. In 1997, President Bill Clinton apologized for the 
Tuskegee Experiment, which misled black Americans that had contracted syphilis into believing that they were 
receiving treatment.  Office of the Press Secretary. “Tuskegee Study - Presidential Apology - CDC - NCHHSTP.” 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2 Mar. 2020, 
www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/clintonp.htm. In February of 2008, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd apologized for the 
historic mistreatment of Aboriginal Australians in parliament.  Adam Gartrell. “'New Era' Dawns after Indigenous 
Apology.” The Sydney Morning Herald, The Sydney Morning Herald, 13 Feb. 2008, 
www.smh.com.au/national/new-era-dawns-after-indigenous-apology-20080213-1rv4.html. 
In July of 2015, Pope Francis visited Bolivia and apologized for the role the Roman Catholic Church played during 
the colonial era.  Jim Yardley and William Neuman. “In Bolivia, Pope Francis Apologizes for Church's 'Grave 
Sins'.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 10 July 2015, 
www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/world/americas/pope-francis-bolivia-catholic-church-apology.html. 
4 Nick Smith nicely outlines many of these problems in the part two of his book I Was Wrong: The Meanings of 
Apologies. These include the issues of standing, delegation, collective intentionality, collective causation, collective 
moral responsibility, collective emotions, collective regret, and collective redress. Nick Smith, I Was Wrong: The 
Meanings of Apologies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).  
5 Janna Thompson argues that collective apologies always fall to the charge of hypocrisy, since to apologize for a 
historic injustice entails expressing regret or remorse for said injustice. However, doing so in turn entails that history 
 
 
apologize on behalf of a whole group.6 Other philosophers such as Janna Thompson (2000), Glen 
Pettigrove (2003), Nick Smith (2008), Alice MacLachlan (2016; 2014; 2013), and Rodney 
Roberts (2017) have begun to analyze the merits of both public and state apologies. 
          In this piece, however, I specifically ask whether collective state apologies can be morally 
legitimate. I argue that they can. By morally legitimate, I mean deserving of the authority, 
seriousness, and consideration that interpersonal apologies usually demand. I refer to my 
interlocutors in this discussion, those who doubt the moral legitimacy of collective state 
apologies, as either political-realists or moral-individualists. The political-realist argues that 
collective-state apologies always lack sincerity and that sincerity is needed for moral legitimacy. 
The moral-individualist on the other hand, argues that no one has the standing to apologize on 
behalf of others, let alone a whole collective. I continue in section III by delineating a taxonomy 
of apologies. The section will highlight not only how morally legitimate apologies are different 
from genuine, sincere, and successful apologies, but also how collective state apologies are 
different from collective, state, and public apologies. In section IV, I consider how both the 
political-realist and moral skeptic argue that 1) -3) cannot be morally legitimate. In section V, I 
respond to both the political-realist and moral-individualist. In particular, I argue that sincerity is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for moral legitimacy. Furthermore, I argue that 
“hyperindividualism," an emphasis on single persons to the point that one is blind to the moral 
relevance of group membership, should be rejected. I propose that at least democratically elected 
leaders have standing to apologize on behalf of their constituents. Thus, so long as collective-
 
be drastically rewritten to the point that one might not exist. On average however, one does not regret one’s 
existence, hence the charge of hypocrisy and the conclusion that “we cannot sincerely apologize for the wrongs done 
by our ancestors, and we should not do so.”  Janna Thompson, “The Apology Paradox,” The Philosophical 
Quarterly, Vol.50, No. 201 (2000): 472.  




state apologies are extended by such leaders, they can be morally legitimate, regardless of 
whether or not they are sincere. 
II. Three Nations, Three Apologies 
The United States Congress has apologized twice for not only slavery but also the era of 
Jim Crow against African Americans. In 2008, the House of Representatives passed Resolution 
194, apologizing for the enslavement and racial segregation of African Americans. The 
resolution, “apologizes to African Americans on behalf of the people of the United States, for the 
wrongs committed against them and their ancestors who suffered under slavery and Jim Crow” 
and “expresses its commitment to rectify the lingering consequences.”7 This is all done for one 
day being able to “move forward and seek reconciliation, justice, and harmony for all people of 
the United States.”8 The resolution also mentions that remorse for slavery is appropriately felt.9  
 This all might make one suspect that the United States Congress would be open to some 
form of reparations or financial compensation for black folk. However, the Senate passed a 
Concurrent Resolution, Resolution 26, the following year. The newer resolution included a 
disclaimer that the apology was not grounds for compensation.10 Nonetheless, Resolution 26 
“calls on all people of the United States to work toward eliminating racial prejudices, injustices, 
and discrimination from our society.” Whether this call to action can result in social change is 
 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid.  
9 It mentions that, “The legislatures of the Commonwealth of Virginia and the States of Alabama, 
Florida, Maryland, and North Carolina have taken the lead in adopting resolutions officially 
expressing appropriate remorse for slavery.” Ibid. 
10In particular, it read “DISCLAIMER.—Nothing in this resolution—(A) authorizes or supports any claim against 
the United States; or (B) serves as a settlement of any claim against the United States.” US Congress, S. Con. Res. 




dubious since, as philosopher Rodney C. Roberts rightly notes, the resolution had many 
problems, including that it was poorly publicized.11 
Focusing now on Canada, in 2017 Prime Minister Justin Trudeau visited the province of 
Newfoundland and Labrador. He apologized to local communities for the abuses indigenous 
children suffered at boarding schools. These boarding schools were established at the turn of the 
20th century by the Moravian Mission and International Grenfell Association with the support of 
the provincial government. While the intended goal of the boarding schools was to educate the 
local populace and provide safe housing, the impact was disastrous. Indeed, many of the children 
were made to feel ashamed of their customs, religion, culture, and even appearance. Colonial 
schools of this sort have rightly been condemned by the Canadian Government as a form of 
cultural genocide, but an apology had not yet been extended to Newfoundland and Labrador.12  
Trudeau evoked emotions typically associated with interpersonal apologies, namely 
shame and how it has made Canadians turn a blind eye to history.13 Furthermore, Trudeau 
seemed to commit to behavioral reform and social change for the sake of reconciliation, 
mentioning “All Canadians have the power to be better and to do better. That is the path to 
reconciliation.”14 Reconciliation was not the only goal of Trudeau’s apology, however, according 
 
11 Roberts writes “unfortunately, there is almost no sense in which the apology resolution was 
communicated to African Americans.  In fact, there is barely a sense in which it was verbally 
delivered to the Senate...the Senate chamber was nearly empty when the resolution was being 
considered. Rodney C. Roberts, “Race, Rectification, and Apology” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and 
Race edited by Naomi Zack (2017). 
12 Austen, Ian. “Trudeau Apologizes for Abuse and 'Profound Cultural Loss' at Indigenous Schools.” The New York 
Times. The New York Times, November 24, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/24/world/canada/trudeau-
indigenous-schools-newfoundland-labrador.html. 
13 “Remarks by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to Apologize on Behalf of the Government of Canada to Former 
Students of the Newfoundland and Labrador Residential Schools.” Prime Minister of Canada, November 24, 2017. 
https://pm.gc.ca/en/news/speeches/2017/11/24/remarks-prime-minister-justin-trudeau-apologize-behalf-government-
canada. 
14 Ibid.  
 
 
to him, it was “time we make things right”.15 The Canadian government settled a class-action 
lawsuit and provided approximately 50 million Canadian dollars to about 900 former students of 
the boarding schools. Lastly, the Canadian government’s apology was not kept behind the closed 
doors of the legislature. It was delivered at the local arts center to the collective which had 
suffered there. It was made publicly available for all to learn about.16  
Let us consider one final case of a state apology. In this particular case, a state apology 
was not extended, but only demanded and ultimately denied. In March of 2019, Mexico’s 
president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (known as AMLO) announced that he had sent two 
letters, one to King Felipe VI of Spain and another to Pope Francis, proposing that the two men 
apologize and ask forgiveness for the abuses indigenous Mexicans suffered. In proposing this, 
AMLO rejected the narrative that the Conquista was a benign discovery of the New World and 
cultural exchange between two peoples.17 MacLachlan would, correctly, say that AMLO was 
relying on the “narrative power”18 of apologies to change the historical record.  
 Unfortunately for AMLO, this proposal was not received well in Spain or even 
domestically in Mexico. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez of the Socialist Worker Party 
rejected the proposal. He mentioned it was “weird to receive now this request for an apology for 
 
15 Ibid. 
16 Austen, Ian. “Trudeau Apologizes for Abuse and 'Profound Cultural Loss' at Indigenous Schools.” The New York 
Times. The New York Times, November 24, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/24/world/canada/trudeau-
indigenous-schools-newfoundland-labrador.html. 
17 AMLO said “It wasn’t just about the encounter of two cultures… It was an invasion. Thousands 
of people were murdered during that period. One culture, one civilization, was imposed upon 
another to the point that the temples — the Catholic churches were built on top of the ancient 
pre-Hispanic temples. Minder, Raphael, and Elisabeth Malkin. “Mexican Call for Conquest Apology Ruffles 
Feathers in Spain. And Mexico.” The New York Times. The New York Times, March 27, 2019. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/27/world/americas/mexico-spain-apology.html. 
18 MacLachlan, “Gender and Public,” 130 
 
 
events that occurred 500 years ago.”19 Rafael Hernando, also of the People’s Party went further 
and implied Mexico should be grateful for the Conquista20; Albert Rivera, leader of Spain’s 
center-right Citizens Party, said AMLO’s proposal amounted to “an intolerable offense to the 
Spanish people.”21 Officially, Spain’s government swiftly replied by denying the call to 
apologize.22  In Mexico, popular columnist Sergio Sarmiento wrote, “The Spaniards who stayed 
in Spain bear no responsibility for what happened here 500 years ago.”23 More interestingly, 
Former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Jorge Castaneda alluded to the idea that the whole proposal 
was a political stunt. He asked “Is this a Pandora’s box we want to open? Or is it pure 
demagogy?” — AMLO was accused of creating a smokescreen for Mexico’s problems, 
including gang violence and a stagnant economy.24  
 
III. Moral Legitimacy and Collective State Apologies 
 Now that we have highlighted a few examples of collective state apologies, it is time for 
us to abstract and see how they fit into the “family tree” of apologies. In this section, I delineate 
a taxonomy of apologies. In doing so I first illustrate how 1) morally legitimate apologies are 
distinct from genuine, sincere, and successful apologies. Afterward, I illustrate how 2) collective 
 
19 Ibid. 
20 Hernando mentions that, “We Spaniards went there and ended the power of tribes that assassinated their 
neighbors with cruelty and fury.” Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Their official statement reads, “We emphatically reject its contents...The arrival of Spaniards 500 years ago to 
present-day Mexican territory cannot be judged in light of contemporary considerations. Our brother nations have 
always known how to read our common past without anger and with a constructive perspective.” Abellán, Lucía, 
and Javier Lafuente. “Madrid Rejects Mexico's Demand for an Apology over Spanish Conquest.” EL PAÍS, March 
26, 2019. https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2019/03/26/inenglish/1553587549_240799.html. 
23  Minder, Raphael, and Elisabeth Malkin. “Mexican Call for Conquest Apology Ruffles Feathers in Spain. And 





state apologies are distinct from collective, state, and public apologies.  This is done for semantic 
clarity and to then be able to ask whether collective state apologies can be morally legitimate.  
To begin, an apology is a speech act. That is, it is a string of words that aims to fulfill 
some function, much like the words "I do" seal a marriage at the altar. Furthermore, an apology 
is usually offered to a recipient who can either accept or reject it I offer the following definition 
of a genuine apology: 
Genuine Apology - A genuine apology fulfills three functions. It claims that i) the actions, 
events, policies, in question were morally wrong, ii) the recipient was wronged by the 
actions, events, policies in question, and iii) the apologizer takes responsibility for the 
actions, events, policies in question. 
It is, of course, entirely possible that a particular apology will have more than the three functions 
listed above. However, note that this definition of a genuine apology does not tell us anything 
about the excellence of the apology. That is, it does not tell us anything about how good an 
apology is. If anything, i-iii serve as what MacLachlan calls “entry-norms” for a speech act to be 
recognized as an apology.25 Think, for instance, of a childhood squabble one might have with 
their sibling. The parent might coerce both siblings to apologize to each other and the siblings, 
through gritting teeth, abide. In which case, both apologies might fulfill i)-iii) above. 
Nonetheless, given that the apologies were compelled, both siblings might view them as poor 
apologies and be dissatisfied with them. 
 
25 MacLachlan writes “a speech act that did not have these features would not be an apology – but they do not, in 
themselves, guarantee a good or successful apology, just as valid moves in a chess game can be better or worse 
examples of chess-playing.” MacLachlan has similar entry norms for what she calls a “valid apology.” The largest 
difference between our two sets of entry norms lies in iv) in which she writes that an apologizer “disavows” the 
actions, events, and policies in question. I chose to avoid the term disavow as I suspect it is in tension with iii), 
taking responsibility for said actions. Alice MacLachlan, “Beyond the Ideal State apology,” in The Uses and Abuses 
of Apology (Palgrave MacMillan 2014) 
 
 
Usually, when we ask whether an apology is good or excellent, we are often asking 
whether it is sincere. In turn, whether or not an apology is sincere will usually depend on 
whether the apology fulfills two additional requirements, namely whether it is accompanied by 
certain emotions (e.g. remorse, guilt, regret) and a commitment to behavioral reform. Lastly, 
successful apologies are determined by how well they perform their intended functions. For 
instance, if one intends for the apology to be accepted (as is often, but not always,27 the case) the 
apology succeeds in this function only in cases which the recipient does actually accept. It is, 
therefore, possible that an apology might perform some of its functions well, and others poorly 
(or not at all). In these cases, we should speak of the apology as being a partial success/failure. 
Of course, exactly what the relationship between genuine, sincere, and successful 
apologies is is highly controversial. In particular, a great deal of time has been spent debating 
whether an apology must be sincere to be genuine. Kathleen Gill (2002) has argued that an 
apology must be sincere in order to be genuine,28 while Glenn Pettigrove (2003)29 and Nick 
Smith (2008)30 have argued that they need not be.  
 
27 One can imagine, for instance, of one apologizing without hope of being forgiven or the apology being accepted. 
One might extend the apology in the hopes of clearing one’s conscience. While apologizing in this manner is self-
serving, the act is still recognizable as an apology and can still be successful.  
28 According to Kathleen Gill, there are five conditions to be met before an apology can be genuine. Two of these 
conditions revolve around sincerity by stipulating that the apologizer must feel certain emotions and have a 
commitment to behavioral reform. Gill specifically mentions that the apologizer “must have an attitude of regret 
with respect to the offensive behavior and a feeling of remorse in response to the suffering of the victim.” In regard 
to behavior, “In regard to behavior, the offender must also make changes so that the victim is justified in believing 
“that the offender will try to refrain from similar offenses in the future.” Kathleen Gill,  “The Moral Functions of an 
Apology,” in Injustice and Rectification, edited by Rodney C. Roberts (New York: A Peter Lang Publication, 2002), 
114..  
29 For Pettigrove, an apology “indicates one’s intention to refrain from similar actions in the future.” Without this, 
the apology is still an apology, but is infelicitous. Glen Pettigrove, “Apology, Reparations, and the Question of 
Inherited Guilt,” Public Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 4, (2003): 323. 
30 Nick Smith suggests that one resist the temptation to adopt a binary standard to declare “whether something “is or 
is not” an apology, focusing instead on “how well [the apology] serves certain purposes and to what extent it 
conveys certain kinds of subtle social meanings.” Smith, I Was Wrong, 12. 
 
 
I join Pettigrove and Smith in claiming that an apology need not be sincere for it to be 
genuine. Philosophers, for the most part, have taken it for granted that apologies are primarily 
moral phenomena. I suspect this has, in part, fueled the popular idea that a genuine apology is 
synonymous to a sincere apology. However, recall that an apology, in and of itself, is simply a 
speech act that fulfills some function. It need not be a moral function. Therefore, a speech act 
need not be a moral phenomena for it to be recognized as belonging to the "family tree" of 
speech acts we recognize as an apology. 
Furthermore, the idea that an apology is necessarily a moral phenomenon is not 
uncontroversial and must be argued for. As Gill correctly notes, apologies have already 
“received a considerable amount of attention from sociologists, psychologists, and linguists.”31 
Furthermore, I argue that it is a mistake to think genuine or sincere apologies necessarily result, 
or ought to result, in moral and relational repair. Often an apology might serve the interests of 
the apologizer more than those of the recipient, by allowing the apologizer to morally redeem 
themselves and control the narrative.32 An apology, even if sincere, might also only be the first 
step to changing a long and historical narrative of injustice. In which case it is reasonable for the 
recipient to hold off on accepting the apology until some behavioral reform or social change is 
actualized.33 For instance, we can take the case of a relationship which has gone though many 
cycles of abuse, cycling from tension building, to abuse, to reconciliation, and back to tension 
building (albeit, it need not look exactly like this). In this case, even if the abuser is sincere when 
 
31 Kathleen Gill, “The Moral Functions of an Apology,” The Philosophical Forum 31, no. 1 (March 2000): 11–27, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/0031-806X.00025. 
32 MacLachlan in particular notes some of these dangers when discussing public apologies during the #MeToo 
movement. Alice MacLachlan, “#MeToo vs. Mea Culpa: On the Risks of Public Apologies” 19, no. 1 (2019): 5. 




apologizing, the abused would be justified if they rejected the apology until the abuser actually 
changed their behavior and broke the vicious cycle. 
Moral and relational repair is not a privileged function of apology, however. The moral 
functions of an apology vary widely,34 and there are also non-moral functions that must be 
considered. Moral functions of an apology are concerned with upholding some ethical standard 
and a common (but not always present) function is moral repair and reconciliation (or at least 
paving the way for such). Non-moral functions of an apology, however, are not concerned with 
upholding some ethical standard but with pursuing some other goal. These include: promoting 
social cohesion for the sake of silencing dissent, psychologically comforting oneself (or others), 
and garnering sympathy in the public eye.  
Moral functions should not be privileged over non-moral functions when considering 
genuine apologies, nor vice versa. To begin, privileging moral functions risks minimizing the 
social and political. Especially in the case of public apologies, which are performed in social 
spaces marked by asymmetries in power, the sociological or political functions of apologies 
cannot be ignored.35 Even if privileging moral functions could be done without minimizing non-
moral functions, to do so assumes that an apology is a primarily moral act, as opposed to a 
linguistic, social, or political act. It is not clear why this should be the case given that, as Gill 
 
34 For instance, Gill tells us that the moral functions of apologies include, but are not limited to: acknowledging the 
wrong done to the victim, reaffirming the rights and self-esteem of the victim, reduction of the wrongdoer’s 
punishment (if the apology is sincere), allowing the wrongdoer to reestablish their moral integrity, social change, 
and even providing grounds for claims of compensation. Gill, “The Moral Functions.” Interestingly enough, Gill 
does not believe that compensation is a function of apology. While both an apology and compensation aim at 
restoration of the victim, an apology is not aimed at giving any material thing to the victim. MacLachlan adds to this 
list when she mentions that the functions of apologies include “narrating a particular story of wrongdoing; 
disavowing those wrongs; acknowledging the addressee as someone impacted by those wrongs; making some 
appropriate commitment, amends, or reform; initiating a process of reconciliation; or, on the other hand, enacting 
appropriate closure of the relationship.” MacLachlan, “Beyond the Ideal” 
35 A notable exception among moral philosophers is MacLachlan. MacLachlan argues that philosophers have, by 
focusing on interpersonal apologies as the default of apologies, distorted the nature and functions of state apologies. 
In fact, “we ought to shift the emphasis in state apology from ‘apology’ to ‘political,’ thinking of them first as a 
form of political practice, that is, a mode of doing politics.” MacLachlan, “Beyond the Ideal” 
 
 
notes, “apologizing is a common social practice that has received a considerable amount of 
attention from sociologists, psychologists, and linguists.”36  Finally, it should be noted that while 
an apology might fail to perform any moral functions, it might be successful in performing any 
non-moral functions it might have.37  
Having now drawn distinctions between genuine, sincere, and successful apologies, I 
posit the following definition of a morally legitimate apology.  
Morally Legitimate Apology - These apologies are genuine (i.e. they claim i-iii). 
Furthermore, iv) these apologies succeed in performing at least one moral function. This 
moral function may vary from case to case, but it will always prioritize the agency of the 
recipient. As such, morally legitimate apologies must be negotiated in advance, especially 
when they involve collectives. Constructing the apology will be a collaborative process 
that prioritizes the voice of the recipient.  
Apologizers should refrain from believing that they themselves know what best 
prioritizes the agency of the recipients. What best prioritizes their agency should be done 
contextually, in situ, and the best way to do this is by including the recipients in the process of 
crafting the apology. By succeeding in this moral function, the apology obligates the recipient to 
seriously consider accepting the apology.  
This definition is inspired by the notion of political legitimacy in political philosophy, 
where it is commonly argued that a legitimate political authority entails obligations of its 
citizens.38 These obligations are authoritative since they are derived from the agency of 
 
36 Gill, “The Moral Functions of an Apology,” 11. 
37 In the section The Cynic and The Skeptic, I highlight some sociological, political, and psychological functions of 
collective state apologies. 
38 For instance, Locke writes “every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one 
government, puts himself under an obligation to every one of that society to submit to the determination of the 
majority, and to be concluded by it” (52f). John Locke and C. B. Macpherson, Second Treatise of Government. 
1690, 1st ed (Indianapolis, Ind: Hackett Pub. Co, 1980). 
 
 
citizens.3940 Likewise, when an apology is morally legitimate it places an obligation on the 
recipient(s) to consider the apology’s merits. These obligations are similarly authoritative since 
they are derived from the agency of the recipient. This is significant since the recipient cannot 
dismiss the apology outright without consideration.  
Dismissing the apology without consideration of accepting it would result in a lack of 
respect for the recipient’s agency since the function of a morally legitimate apology derives from 
the recipient’s agency. It simultaneously results in a lack of respect to upholding ethical 
standards, since the function of morally legitimate apologies is a moral function. Of course, the 
recipient is under no obligation to accept the apology. Again, as argued by MacLachlan, under 
complicated histories of public and private wrongdoing, the recipient may have good reason to 
reject a morally legitimate apology, no matter how excellent it is. Nonetheless, morally 
legitimate apologies go some distance in addressing the aforementioned asymmetries of power, 
namely by inviting the recipient to the table and prioritizing their agency.  
Some more distinctions are in order. While a morally legitimate apology is necessarily a 
genuine apology, not all genuine apologies are morally legitimate. This is because genuine 
apologies might fail to fulfill iv) as stipulated above but still fulfill i)-iii). That is, a genuine 
apology need not fulfill a moral function. One might object here by asking what i)-iii) are, if not 
moral functions. However, as we will see with the political-realist, it is possible to fulfill i)-iii) 
but be insincere and even have ulterior motives. I)-iii) only require the apologizer to make 
claims, not to make claims sincerely and without ulterior motives.  
 
39 For instance, Locke writes “every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one 
government, puts himself under an obligation to every one of that society to submit to the determination of the 
majority, and to be concluded by it.” John Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government, edited by C. B. 
MacPherson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1990 [1690]), 52f. For a competing view see Ronald Dworkin, 
Law’s Empire, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986).  
40 For a competing view, see Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 9. print (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard 
Univ. Press, 1995). 
 
 
Furthermore, while a morally legitimate apology is necessarily a successful apology, not 
all successful apologies are morally legitimate. A successful apology might succeed in non-
moral functions (e.g., in its political or social functions). Finally, sincerity is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for an apology to be morally legitimate. I will say more about this when replying to 
the political-realist.  
With this definition in place, I now move on to highlight the distinction between 
collective state apologies, and collective, public, and state apologies. I posit the following 
definition:  
Collective State Apologies: Apologies offered by recognized political leaders on behalf of 
a collective to another collective. The apology is offered in a public forum and sanctioned 
by the state.  
Since both the apologizer and recipient are collectives, collective state apologies are 
necessarily between groups. Thus, it is correct to say that collective state apologies are collective 
apologies, but not all collective apologies are collective state apologies. There could, for 
instance, exist apologies between collectives who are “corporations, churches, non-profits, 
community, and other institutions.”41  Furthermore, collective apologies, while always on behalf 
of a collective, might not be offered to collectives.42 It would also be correct to say that collective 
state apologies are public apologies, but not all public apologies are collective state apologies. 
 
41 Alice MacLachlan. “Fiduciary Duties and the Ethics of Public Apology” in Journal of Applied Philosophy (2016): 
5. MacLachlan considers the gold standard of the corporate apologies to be Johnson and Johnson’s official apology 
in 1982 when they discovered that someone had tampered with Tylenol capsules by inserting cyanide into them. See 
Jerry Knight, ‘Tylenol’s maker shows how to respond to crisis,’ The Washington Post 11 October (1982): 
online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1982/10/11/tylenols-maker-shows-how-to- 
respond-to-crisis/bc8df898-3fcf-443f-bc2f-e6fbd639a5a3/.  
42See, for instance, the Canadian Government’s 2007 apology to Maher Arar, a Candian citizen who was unjustly 
suspected of being an Al Qaeda member and tortured in Syria. Social Development Canada. “Prime Minister 
Releases Letter of Apology to Maher Arar and his Family and Announces Completion of Mediation Process.” 




Observe the number of public apologies that ensued from the #MeToo movement in which 
powerful men publicly apologized for their (individual) behavior.43 Lastly, a collective-state 
apology is a state apology, but not all state apologies are collective state apologies. As 
MacLachlan correctly tells us again, “a publicly issued apology from one head of state to another 
will certainly take on political significance.”44 This would be the case even if the first head of 
state was acting out of their official capacity (i.e., the apology was not sanctioned by the state, 
and therefore not official).  
 The question I press in the remainder of this chapter is whether collective state apologies 
can be morally legitimate. Before seeing the political-realist’s and moral-individualist’s reply to 
this question, I examine three collective state apologies. I will refer to these three collective state 
apologies throughout the remainder of my paper. 
 
IV. The Realist and the Individualist 
In this section, I turn my attention to how the political-realist and the moral-individualist 
would argue that collective state apologies cannot be morally legitimate.  
To begin, all three of the apologies in section II can, in confidence, be said to be 
collective state apologies (or in Mexico’s case, a demand for such an apology). The apology 
concerned a political leader apologizing on behalf of one collective to another collective. 
Furthermore, the apology was in a public forum and state-sanctioned. But are these apologies 
 
43 See, for instance the following, Madison Park, “Kevin Spacey Apologizes for Alleged Sex Assault with a Minor,” 
CNN, October 31, 2017. The New York Times, “Louis CK Responds to Accusations: ‘These Stories Are True’,” 
The New York Times, November 10, 2017. Emily Stewart, “Aziz Ansari Responds to Sexual Misconduct 
Allegations Against Him,” VOX, January 15, 2018). 
44 MacLachlan, “Beyond the Ideal”  
 
 
morally legitimate? According to the political-realist, collective state apologies cannot be 
morally legitimate because the apologizer is never sincere and cannot be sincere. The apology 
cannot be sincere because it cannot realistically attain the emotional intimacy associated with 
interpersonal apologies. This emotional intimacy is what allows the apologizer to feel regret, 
remorse, shame, etc. But to have this emotional intimacy the political leader, as well as the whole 
collective they speak for, would need to have a personal relationship with every recipient of the 
apology.45 This is logistically impossible. MacLachlan writes:  
In the absence of interpersonal feelings and attitudes, what appropriate moral motivation 
is there to drive state apologies? The cynical answer is, of course, that they lose meaning 
qua apologies altogether: because they are public, formal and pre-negotiated, they are 
empty gestures.46 
Suspending disbelief for a moment however and assume that all (or enough)47 members of the 
apologizing collective could feel these emotions. The apology would still not be sincere. As 
Thompson notes, collective state apologies are often apologies for massive historic injustices 
against minority groups. To be sincere in such an apology would be to regret those injustices and 
prefer that they had not occurred. Unfortunately, however, “if our ancestors had not done what 
they did to indigenous people, to the blacks, the Jews, the Irish, then the history of our country, 
 
45 Nick Smith speaks a bit on some of the difficulties in conceiving of collective emotions in a collective apology. 
He writes: “Perhaps the least controversial sense of collective emotions takes an aggregate view: We can say that a 
collective experiences certain emotions if some portion of its membership feels them... [This] returns us to the 
problem of attributing properties of group members to the whole: What percentage of the group must feel the 
emotion in order to describe it as collectively experienced? If only a few in a group of millions feel guilt and 
sympathy for a victim, then it seems disingenuous to speak of the emotion collectively experienced. Smith, I Was 
Wrong, 240 - 245.  
46 Alice MacLachlan, “Government Apologies to Indigenous People,” in Justice, Responsibility and Reconciliation 
in the Wake of Conflict, (Boston Studies in Philosophy, Religion and Public Life, 2013): 193.  
47 See Smith, I Was Wrong,  240 - 245. As Smith asks, what percentage of the group must feel these emotions in 
order for it to count? The answer to this will ultimately be arbitrary.   
 
 
indeed the history of the world, would have been significantly different from what it has been, 
and we would not exist.”48 Thompson continues by noting that one cannot regret one’s existence 
and thus, collective state apologies cannot be sincere.  
Instead of being sincere, the political leader is merely performing a role while harboring 
hidden motives. Michael Cunningham best summarizes the political-realist’s view. When 
speaking of the general cynicism surrounding collective state apologies, he writes “the apology is 
seen as a form of ‘gestural’ politics, incurring no costs for government and often serving as a 
(literally) cheap way to win favor with particular political or electoral grouping.”49 
 Recall how AMLO was accused of having ulterior motives for requesting an apology. 
Former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Jorge Castaneda G. implied that AMLO’s whole proposal 
was a political stunt.50 Recall also that AMLO was accused of creating a smokescreen for 
Mexico’s problems, including gang violence and a stagnant economy. The political-realist would 
here agree with this line of criticism. AMLO is merely engaging in rhetoric that panders to 
indigenous Mexicans without offering any actual relief. 
Furthermore, if the political-realist is correct, then not only was AMLO’s demand for an 
apology insincere, but one should not be surprised that it never actually aimed at moral functions 
such as moral or relational repair.  In regards to moral repair, well, as many of AMLO’s 
detractors pointed out, no one today is a Conquistador on a holy mission in present-day Mexico. 
Thus, any talk of taking responsibility is a thinly veiled attempt at garnering favor via identity 
politics. As for relational repair, many Spanish politicians took the request as an insult and even 
 
48 Thompson, “The Apology Paradox,” 471 
49 Michael Cunningham, “Apologies in Irish politics: a commentary and critique,” in Contemporary British History 
Vol. 18, No. 4 2004): 81. 
50Minder, Raphael, and Elisabeth Malkin. “Mexican Call for Conquest Apology Ruffles Feathers in Spain. And 




many Mexican columnists felt frustrated, to say the least, with AMLO. If anything, the call for 
an apology lessened the possibility of moral repair.  
Of course, the political-realist’s position is not confined to Mexico. It also enjoys 
popularity among conservatives in the United States who view collective state apologies as 
pandering to liberal “woke culture.”51 And of course, Justin Trudeau has also been suspected of 
using apologies as political stunts. Both political columnist John Ivison52 and Member of 
Parliament Marilyn Gladu53 have accused Justin Trudeau of political pandering and insincerity. 
Finally, it should be noted that while many of the aforementioned academics speak on the 
political-realists’ position, they do not usually adopt the position themselves. In fact, it seems 
that the political-realist’s position is most prevalent among non-scholars. For instance, Tyler 
Okimoto et al. conducted research with 128 Australian-born participants. In response to the 
rising trend of collective apologies, participants simultaneously demanded more apologies but 
were also more likely to see them as insincere and “routine.”54 Scholars such as myself, on the 
 
51  See, for instance, during President Bill Clinton’s African tour he apologized twice, once in Rwanda for western 
inaction during the Rwandan genocide and again in Uganda for the slave trade. Clinton’s actions were heavily 
scrutinized.  “Clinton was attacked by the right for groveling and pandering' during his African tour… Clinton's 
apologies in Africa were not exactly insincere but they were clearly subordinate to political interests. And in politics 
you only say sorry when it suits you.” Ryle, John. “A Sorry Apology from Clinton.” The Guardian. Guardian News 
and Media, April 13, 1998. https://www.theguardian.com/Columnists/Column/0,5673,234216,00.html. 
52 The article reads “Are [his apologies] sincere? … It is hard to escape the feeling that political expediency is at 
work for the Liberals; each apology was targeted at a key political constituency — Sikh, LGBTQ, Indigenous and 
Jewish Canadians.”  John Ivison, “John Ivison: With Another Apology, Trudeau Tries to Right - and Rewrite - the 
Past.” National Post, May 9, 2018. https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/john-ivison-with-another-apology-trudeau-
tries-to-right-and-rewrite-the-past. 
53 According to the article, Gladu “said apologies should not be monthly occurrences, adding that it's becoming a 
"show." "I've heard rhetoric even amongst my constituency that perhaps it's not sincere. What else does he do, 
besides apologize for things that happened years and years ago?” Janice Dickson, “Conservative MP Questions 
Whether Trudeau's Apologies Are Sincere.” National Newswatch, May 9, 2018. 
https://www.nationalnewswatch.com/2018/05/09/conservative-mp-questions-whether-trudeaus-apologies-are-
sincere/#.XpD_DchKiUm. 
54 See, for instance. Tyler G. Okimoto, Michael Wenzel, and Matthew J. Hornsey, “Apologies Demanded yet 
Devalued: Normative Dilution in the Age of Apology,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 60 (September 
2015): 133–36, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2015.05.008. 
 
 
other hand, often speak to the potential that these apologies have, even if they face obstacles.55 
The possibility that political-realists might view scholars as naïve and “out-of-touch” idealists 
should be taken seriously, especially if we want our views theoretical views on apology to be 
taken seriously by all. 
 I turn my attention now to the moral-individualist. While the moral-individualist might 
have many concerns,56 in this piece I focus particularly on their concern regarding standing.  The 
moral-individualist, like the political-realist, also argues that collective state apologies cannot be 
morally legitimate. Unlike the political-realist however, the moral-individualist does not care 
about sincerity. Instead, the moral-individualist argues that collective state apologies cannot be 
morally legitimate because they cannot be genuine. Recall that a morally legitimate apology 
must be genuine. The moral-individualist draws attention to claim iii) of genuine apologies, 
namely that the apologizer takes responsibility for the actions, events, policies in question. 
According to the moral-individualist, claim iii) is devoid of meaning in all collective apologies 
since individuals can only take responsibility for their own behavior, not the behavior of others. 
In fact, collective responsibility is impossible, since individuals, not collectives, are the sole 
building blocks of morality.57 This is all to say, that the political leader (and ultimately anyone) 
lacks standing to apologize on behalf of others. Proponents of this view date as far back as 1948, 
 
55See, for instance, Hornsey (2015) and Wohl (2011). Matthew J. Hornsey, Michael Ja Wohl, and Catherine R. 
Philpot, “Collective Apologies and Their Effects on Forgiveness: Pessimistic Evidence but Constructive 
Implications,” Australian Psychologist 50, no. 2 (April 1, 2015): 106–14, https://doi.org/10.1111/ap.12087; Michael 
J. A. Wohl, Matthew J. Hornsey, and Catherine R. Philpot, “A Critical Review of Official Public Apologies: Aims, 
Pitfalls, and a Staircase Model of Effectiveness,” Social Issues and Policy Review 5, no. 1 (2011): 70–100, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-2409.2011.01026.x. 
56  As mentioned in an earlier footnote, Nick Smith outlines many of these problems in the part two of his book I 
Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies. These include the issues of standing, delegation, collective intentionality, 
collective causation, collective moral responsibility, collective emotions, collective regret, and collective redress. 
Smith, I Was Wrong.  
57 Charles Griswold calls this immensely popular notion in philosophy, “common-sense moral individualism: 
individuals are the basic moral units; to them is ascribed responsibility for good or wrong-doing, responsibility for 
contrition and forgiveness.”  Charles L. Griswold, Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 2007), 118. 
 
 
when the theologian H.D. Lewis called collective responsibility “barbarous.” Proponents also 
include more contemporary philosophers, such as Stephen Sverdlik (1987), Jan Narveson, 
(2002), and Andras Szigeti (2014).58 
The moral-individualists does not claim that collective state apologies cannot be 
successful, however. The moral-individualist might argue that the collective state apology can 
still succeed at sociological or psychological functions. In regards to sociological functions, the 
collective state apology might promote social cohesion. The apology might serve as a symbolic 
gesture aimed at alleviating tensions between the involved collectives. The hope is that both 
collectives will no longer hold a grudge or resentment towards the other, but let bygones be 
bygones. The apologizing collective and their political leader might truly be committed to social 
change insofar as that change promotes harmony. This commitment is not grounded by any 
collective moral responsibility to do better. Instead, it is merely grounded in the prudential 
concern of promoting reconciliation.  
The United States Congress’ apology explicitly mentions that it hopes to heal the racial 
rifts between white and black Americans, to “move forward and seek reconciliation, justice, and 
harmony for all people of the United States.” The apology does task all Americans with the 
responsibility of “eliminating racial prejudices, injustices, and discrimination from [American] 
society” but this “responsibility” is required not by moral obligation, but simple prudential 
concerns of securing a more cohesive nation. Insofar as this prudential concern aims at silencing 
 
58 Jan Narveson, “Collective Responsibility,” Collective Responsibility, 2002; András Szigeti, “Are Individualist 
Accounts of Collective Responsibility Morally Deficient?,” in Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents, ed. Anita 
Konzelmann Ziv and Hans Bernhard Schmid (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2014), 329–42, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6934-2_20; Stephen Sverdlik, “Collective Responsibility,” Philosophical 
Studies 51 (1987): 61-76. 
 
 
or placating dissent and not upholding some ethical standard (e.g. bettering the lives of all 
Americans), it fails to fulfill a moral function. 
 Unfortunately, recent research has shown that although collective apologies have become 
more common, they have also become more expected, less valued, and less likely to result in 
forgiveness.59 Michael Wenzel believes collective state apologies can still promote social 
cohesion as long as they rely on the notion of hope.60 Thus, if a collective wants their apology to 
be successful, then they should suffuse it with hopeful language of a desirable (and attainable) 
future state of affairs. To Wenzel, doing such does not mean the apologizing collective is 
extending their apology insincerely. They might genuinely desire less hostility or a mutually 
beneficial relationship with the other collective. Still, any mention of blame or responsibility in 
their language should not be understood in the literal sense, but as a metaphor used to describe 
hope and promise.61  
 
59 Recent research conducted by social psychologist Tyler G. Okimoto shows that public apologies, while more 
common, have also become more expected by victims, less valued, and less likely to promote forgiveness. See Tyler 
G. Okimoto, “Apologies Demanded Yet Devalued: Normative Dilution in the Age of Apology.” Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology. Academic Press, June 2, 2015. 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103115000591. Also see Matthew Hornsey, “Embodied 
Remorse: Physical Displays of Remorse Increase Positive Responses to Public Apologies, but Have Negligible Effects 
on Forgiveness.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, December 2019. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000208. Fix the formatting here 
 
60 Michael Wenzel, “Collective Apology, Hope, and Forgiveness.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 
Academic Press, May 12, 2017. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103116302487#! 
61 A more pessimistic take on social cohesion is that the apologizing collective wants to let bygones be bygones, not 
for the sake of a hopeful and mutually beneficial future with the other collective, but for the sake of “sweeping under 
the rug” past injustices. The apologizing collective might truly believe that they acted irresponsibly and are 
blameworthy, but the state leader may not care, have little sympathy, little compassion, or even a bigoted view of the 
other collective. Nonetheless the state leader might still extend an apology out of fear of protests, riots, or even 
revolution. Nonetheless, whether one takes a Wenzel’s hope-centric interpretation or a more pessimistic take, the 
goal is group cohesion.  
 
 
 In regards to psychological functions, collective state apologies can promote and 
safeguard the psychological well-being of the apologizer. These apologies serve as a form of 
expunging misplaced guilt, especially white guilt (or colonial-settler guilt).  
 According to the moral-individualist, collective state apologies are ultimately more self-
directed than other-directed. It should therefore not be surprising when scientific evidence tells 
us that group guilt is also a self-directed emotion.62  Any collective guilt is ultimately misplaced 
though since collectives cannot be responsible. Collective guilt is, therefore, a psychological 
ailment, something one must cure themselves of as soon as possible. Preventing folks from 
feeling this guilt is the ideal solution. Nonetheless, some folks will ultimately succumb to this 
guilt, in which case a collective state apology serves as a useful cure, a way to take control of the 
narrative and morally redeem oneself. 
 Columnist Linda Besner echoes the psychological function of collective state apologies 
when she writes of Justin Trudeau: 
It’s hard not to see Trudeau’s penchant for penitence as a particularly Canadian form of 
self-aggrandizement – humble-bragging about how bad you feel. Congratulating 
ourselves for feeling guilty makes us feel good again, and the praise we lavish on 
ourselves for our honesty is warmly received – by us.63  
 
62 As psychologist Aarti Iyer from the University of California, Santa Cruz concluded from her research into white 
guilt:  
“Based in theory and research on personal guilt, we argued that group-based guilt is a self-focused emotional 
experience of in-group responsibility for an immoral advantage. More specifically, White guilt is a dysphoria 
European Americans can feel when focused on their illegitimate racial advantage over African Americans...we showed 
that a self-focused framing of racial discrimination, as perpetrated by European Americans, produced more guilt than 
an other-focused framing that described African Americans as the targets of racial discrimination. There was thus 
good support for our conceptualization of White guilt as a self-focused emotional reaction to racial inequality.” Aarti 
Iyer, “White Guilt and Racial Compensation: The Benefits and Limits of Self-Focus.” Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin 29, no. 1 (2003): 117–29. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167202238377. 
63 Linda Besner, “Is Canada Apologising Too Much? | Linda Besner.” The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 




When collective state apologies fulfill this psychological function, they prioritize the feelings of 
the apologizer, not the agency of the recipient.  
 
V. Rejecting Sincerity and Hyperindividualism 
 In this section, I respond to both the political-realist and moral-individualist. To begin, I 
sympathize with the political-realist in suspecting that many political leaders might have ulterior 
motives when extending collective state apologies.64 However, the political-realist mistakenly 
fixates on emotions. It is true that it is logistically implausible, and perhaps even impossible, for 
all or enough members of an apologizing collective to feel emotions of regret, shame, guilt, etc. 
But feeling these emotions are only necessary for the apology to be sincere, not morally 
legitimate. I mentioned earlier that sincerity is neither necessary nor sufficient for an apology to 
be morally legitimate. I return to this point now.  
Let us take cases of rectificatory justice in particular. I borrow Roberts’ conception of 
rectificatory justice it which includes “at least four essential elements: restoration, compensation, 
apology, and punishment.”65 A morally legitimate apology might fulfill the moral function of 
offering restoration and compensation to the victim(s) while punishing any wrongdoers.66 This in 
itself might be reason enough to consider accepting the apology, so long as compensation 
prioritizes the agency of the recipients. Sincerity would not be necessary. In this case, I agree 
with Roberts when he argues that what he calls a just apology is legitimate and need not be 
sincere. Roberts writes, “Contrary to those who think that when rendering a legitimate apology 
 
64 Of course, we might never truly know their motives unless they were exposed in some scandal or they told us. 
Nonetheless, as I continue arguing, the political-realist is mistaken to think that ulterior motives precludes an 
apology being morally legitimate.  
65 Roberts, “Race, Rectification, and Apology.” 
66 Roberts concedes that restoration is not possible in all situations, since what was lost may never be recoverable. 
Here I agree with Roberts and add that punishment may not always be available as the wrongdoing agents may no 
longer exist.  
 
 
one must really be sorry for that which he or she is apologizing, the just apology does not include 
as a necessary condition that those who apologize have certain feelings.”67 For Roberts, this is so 
since a just apology concerns itself with rectificatory justice and not the whole of morality. 
Rectificatory justice does, however, “require that unjust losses be restored or compensated for.”68 
According to Roberts, if compensation is not given (or at least earnestly attempted) then the 
apology is illegitimate. 
Unlike Roberts however, I do not think compensation is necessary for an apology to be 
morally legitimate. I suspect Roberts believes compensation is necessary for legitimacy since, if 
one truly listens to the recipients when crafting an apology, one will often find that compensation 
is what best prioritizes the recipients’ agency. One should be prepared to offer compensation if 
this turns out to be the case. However, it might not be the case. As MacLachlan notes, when 
evaluating the excellence of an apology it must always be done contextually, in situ.69 Likewise, 
I would argue what best prioritizes the agency of the recipients must be done contextually, in 
situ, and the best way to do this is by including the recipients in the process of crafting the 
apology. One might find that in some situations the symbolic significance of a collective state 
apology is just as important, or even more important, than any compensation it gives.70 
Neither is sincerity sufficient for an apology to be morally legitimate. While sincerity 
could be understood as a moral function, the moral function of a morally legitimate apology must 
prioritize the agency of the recipient. If, as has been said, the recipient’s agency is best promoted 
by being financially compensated, then sincerity will be irrelevant. Again, this all highlights why 
 
67 Roberts, “Race, Rectification, and Apology.”  
68 Ibid. 
69 MacLachlan, “Fiduciary Duties,” 3 
70 MacLachlan, “Government Apologies to Indigenous Peoples,” 199. See also Jeremy Waldron, “The supersession 
of historical injustice,” Ethics Vol. 103. No. 1 (1992):6. Waldron writes that small gestures in public apologies  
“symbolize a society’s undertaking not to forget or deny that a particular justice took place.”  
 
 
it is vital to include the recipient in the process of constructing an apology. Any apology which 
fails to include the voice of the recipient will fail to be morally legitimate and can, therefore, be 
dismissed without consideration.  
Furthermore, if the recipients’ agency is prioritized then the ulterior motives of the 
political leader might be thwarted. But they might not be. So long as the political leader’s agenda 
is not prioritized before the agency of the recipients, it does not matter if the leader succeeds in 
their ulterior motives. So much for the political-realist. 
As for the moral-individualist, my strategy is to deny that individuals are the sole 
building block of responsibility. This would allow third parties to apologize on behalf of others 
and pave the way for political leaders to have standing. This is roughly the strategy that Charles 
Griswold and MacLachlan rely on when they argue for the possibility of third-party forgiveness. 
Charles Griswold discusses why some folks might be hesitant to allow third parties to forgive on 
behalf71 of victims, namely by directing attention to “what one might call common-sense moral 
individualism: individuals are the basic moral units; to them is ascribed responsibility for good or 
wrong-doing, responsibility for contrition and forgiveness.”72 Instead of rejecting the possibility 
of third party forgiveness at this point, Griswold invites us to consider cases in which one’s 
loved one is murdered. He points, for instance, to the murder of Amy Biehl. Two of her 
murderers eventually “met Biehl’s parents, asked for and received their forgiveness, and joined 
the staff of the Foundation set up by the parents to improve the lot of the poor in South Africa.73 
 
71 Strictly speaking, Griswold’s type of third-party forgiveness might be best understood as proxy forgiveness since 
the third-party is serving as a surrogate for the injured party. For an account where third-party forgiveness cannot be 
reduced to proxy forgiveness see Alice MacLachlan, “In Defense of Third-Party Forgiveness,” In Moral Psychology 
of Forgiveness. (2017). 
72 Griswold, Forgiveness, 118 
73 Griswold, Forgiveness, 95 
 
 
Griswold asks us to note two things from these cases, namely 1) the powerfully 
transformative power of forgiveness and 2) the ability to forgive on behalf of others, in this case, 
a deceased loved one.  
The moral-individualist will object to 2), and insist that the parents of Biehl are only 
forgiving for the pain and anguish they themselves felt, not their daughters’ murder. Of course, 
Biehl’s parents might believe they are forgiving the murder itself, but they are simply confused 
as to how morality operates.  
 Griswold calls this objection originating from moral individualism to be a “hard-line” 
response. It is too extreme and unfairly dismisses what Biehl’s parents report feeling. 
MacLachlan similarly argues that denying third-party forgiveness risks distorting the 
complexities of moral reality in the name of a “hyperindividualism.”74  
Instead of adopting this hyperindividualism, Griswold suggests a compromise in the 
following form:  
I suggest that a third party may forgive on behalf of the victim, but only if that third 
person also has standing to do so. Standing would seem to presuppose not only justifiable 
indignation (sympathetic resentment), but also something else: identification with the 
victim… Identification, however, must be warranted... It is warranted by the combination 
of at least two things: first, ties of care for the victim; second, reasonably detailed 
knowledge not only of the offender’s wrong-doing and contrition, but especially of the 
victim.75 
 
74Alice MacLachlan, “In Defense of Third-Party Forgiveness,” In Moral Psychology of Forgiveness. (2017), 136, 
147-148. 
75 Griswold, Forgiveness, 119. 
 
 
MacLachlan proposes something similar when she mentions that “we can recognize a distinct 
variant of forgiveness, third-party forgiveness, which is appropriately grounded in an 
imaginatively engaged, caring relationship of moral solidarity.”76  
I mention all this to highlight the possibility that if third-party forgiveness is legitimate, 
then one should not be so quick to dismiss collective state apologies. If third-party forgiveness 
should not be constrained by hyperindividualism, then it is plausible that collective state 
apologies should not be either. Objecting to collective state apologies based on the basis of 
hyperindividualism similarly risks distorting the complexities of moral reality. The moral reality 
in question here is that group membership is relevant and collectives are often held responsible 
in social and political practices. 
Of course, if one is using third-party forgiveness as one’s inspiration here, then collective 
state apologizers would require an identification, one that is legitimate, with the transgressing 
collective. In other words, political leaders would require standing. I propose that at least being a 
democratically elected leader of the transgressing party gives one such standing. In this sense, 
collective state apologies can potentially enjoy a “double legitimacy.” If they prioritize the 
agency of the recipients then obligations placed on recipients are legitimate since their authority 
is derived from the recipients’ agency. Moreover, they are also legitimate to the other collective, 
the political leader’s constituents. This is because, as an elected official acting in their official 
capacity, the apology’s authority is also partially derived from the constituents’ agency.   
 
VI.  Concluding Remarks 
 
76 Alice MacLachlan, “In Defense of Third-Party Forgiveness,” In Moral Psychology of Forgiveness. (2017), 152. 
 
 
In this paper, I have focused only on collective state apologies. By doing so, I have 
argued against the political-realist and moral-individuals who argue that these apologies cannot 
be morally legitimate. They can be morally legitimate insofar as they fulfill some moral function 
by inviting the recipient of said apologies to the table. Of course, in contemporary cases of 
injustice it must be noted that activist groups have often clamored and insisted on being invited 
to the table. Groups like Black Lives Matter in the United States for instance, have made many of 
their aims (e.g. better education of urban schools, better housing, defunding of police 
departments) known to the public at large. In which case, political leaders must simply reach out 
to those groups and start the work of crafting an apology, work that is often already well 
underway on the recipients’ end.  
One final concern that has not been discussed is who, exactly, should be invited to the 
table on the recipients’ behalf? That is, who can speak on what best prioritizes the agency of the 
recipients, and what gives them the authority to do so? I have no immediate answer, but I suggest 
that we begin by looking at large (inter)national movements and groups which have garnered 
massive support. I have already mentioned Black Lives Matter, but political leaders might 
likewise need to reach out to groups such as the NAACP, and the #MeToo organization, 
including Tarana Burke, its founder and unofficial leader.  
Nonetheless, the issue with doing the above is that some of the organizations are de-
centralized and have no actual official leaders. In which case, a second suggestions would be to 
first create the table that will collaborate on the apology. Afterward, the recipients could 
themselves vote for their representatives on the table. For instance, H.R. 40, seeks to establish 
 
 
the Commission to Study and Develop Reparation Proposals for African-Americans.77 Instead of 
congress itself appointing members of this commission, it might be best if the U.S. public 
themselves vote on their representatives, while reserving a certain number of seats for African-
Americans.  
Nonetheless, these are just two suggestions. As mentioned earlier, each case will have to 

















77 Sheila Jackson Lee, “H.R.40 - 116th Congress (2019-2020): Commission to Study and Develop 











Abellán, Lucía, and Javier Lafuente. “Madrid Rejects Mexico's Demand for an Apology over 
Spanish Conquest.” EL 
PAÍS, March 26, 2019. 
https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2019/03/26/inenglish/1553587549_240799.html. 
 
Austen, Ian. “Trudeau Apologizes for Abuse and 'Profound Cultural Loss' at Indigenous 
Schools.” The New York Times. 




Austin, J. How to Do Things with Words, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975). 
 
Besner, Linda. “Is Canada Apologising Too Much? | Linda Besner.” The Guardian. Guardian 




Cunningham, Michael. “Apologies in Irish politics: a commentary and critique,” in 
Contemporary British History Vol. 18, 
No. 4 2004): 80–92 
 
Dickson, Janice. “Conservative MP Questions Whether Trudeau's Apologies Are Sincere.” 




Dworkin, Ronald. Law’s Empire, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986).  
 




Herald, 13 Feb. 2008, www.smh.com.au/national/new-era-dawns-after-indigenous-
apology-20080213-1rv4.html. 
 
Gill, Kathleen. “The Moral Functions of an Apology,” in Injustice and Rectification, edited by 
Rodney C. Roberts (New 
York: A Peter Lang Publication, 2002), 111-123.  
 
Gibney, Mark. The Age of Apology: Facing up to the Past (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
 
Griswold, Charles L. Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 2007). 
 
Held, Virginia. “Can a Random Collection of Individuals be Responsible?”, Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 67 (1970), 471 
481. 
 
Hornsey, Matthew J., Michael J. A. Wohl, Emily A. Harris, Tyler G. Okimoto, Michael Thai, 
and Michael Wenzel. 
“Embodied Remorse: Physical Displays of Remorse Increase Positive Responses to 
Public Apologies, but Have Negligible Effects on Forgiveness.” Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, December 2019. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000208. 
 
Ivison, John. “John Ivison: With Another Apology, Trudeau Tries to Right - and Rewrite - the 




Iyer, Aarti, Colin Wayne Leach, and Faye J. Crosby. “White Guilt and Racial Compensation: 
The Benefits and Limits of 
Self-Focus.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 29, no. 1 (2003): 117–29. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167202238377. 
 






Lazare, Aaron. On Apology (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
 
Locke, John. Second Treatise on Civil Government, edited by C. B. MacPherson (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing, 1990 [1690]). 
 
MacLachlan, Alice. “#MeToo vs. Mea Culpa: On the Risks of Public Apologies,”in APA 
Newsletter: Feminism and 
 
 
Philosophy Vol. 19 No. 1 (2019): 24-28. 
 
 “In Defense of Third-Party Forgiveness,” In Moral Psychology of Forgiveness. (2017), 
135-160.  
  
 “Fiduciary Duties and the Ethics of Public Apology” in Journal of Applied Philosophy 
(2016): 1- 22 
 
“Beyond the Ideal State apology,” in The Uses and Abuses of Apology (Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2014) 
 
“Gender and Public Apology,” in Transitional Justice Review. Vol. 1 No. 2 (2013): 126-
147 
 
 “Government Apologies to Indigenous People,” in Justice, Responsibility and 
Reconciliation in the Wake of Conflict, (Boston Studies in Philosophy, Religion and 
Public Life, 2013): 183-203.  
 
 
Minder, Raphael, and Elisabeth Malkin. “Mexican Call for Conquest Apology Ruffles Feathers 
in Spain. And Mexico.” 
The New York Times. The New York Times, March 27, 2019. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/27/world/americas/mexico-spain-apology.html. 
 
Office of the Press Secretary. “Tuskegee Study - Presidential Apology - CDC - NCHHSTP.” 
Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2 Mar. 2020, 
www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/clintonp.htm. 
 
Okimoto, Tyler G., Michael Wenzel, and Matthew J. Hornsey. “Apologies Demanded Yet 
Devalued: Normative Dilution 
in the Age of Apology.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. Academic Press, 
June 2, 2015. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103115000591. 
 
Park, Madison.“Kevin Spacey Apologizes for Alleged Sex Assault with a Minor,” CNN, October 
31, 2017.  
 
Pettigrove, Glen. (2003). “Apology, Reparations, and the Question of Inherited Guilt,” Public 
Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 17, 
No. 4, (2003): 319–348. 
 
 “Remarks by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to Apologize on Behalf of the Government of 
Canada to Former Students of 
the Newfoundland and Labrador Residential Schools.” Prime Minister of Canada, 





Roberts, Rodney C. “Race, Rectification, and Apology” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy 
and Race edited by Naomi 
Zack (2017). 
 




Smith, Nick. I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008) 
 
Social Development Canada. “Prime Minister Releases Letter of Apology to Maher Arar and his 
Family and Announces 




Stewart, Emily. “Aziz Ansari Responds to Sexual Misconduct Allegations Against Him,” VOX, 
January 15, 2018). 
 
The New York Times.“Louis CK Responds to Accusations: ‘These Stories Are True’,” The New 
York Times, November 
10, 2017. 
 
Thompson, Janna. “The Apology Paradox,” The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.50, No. 201 
(2000): 470-475. 
 
US Congress, H. Res. 194, 110th Cong. 2nd sess., 29 July 2008. 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hres194/text  
 
US Congress, S. Con. Res. 26, 111th Cong. 1st sess., 18 June 2009. 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/senate-concurrent-resolution/26/text  
 
Waldron, Jeremy. “The supersession of historical injustice,” Ethics Vol. 103. No. 1 (1992):4–28 
 
Wenzel, Michael, Farid Anvari, Melissa de Vel-Palumbo, and Simon M. Bury. “Collective 
Apology, Hope, and 
Forgiveness.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. Academic Press, May 12, 
2017. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103116302487#! 
 
Yardle, Jim, and William Neuman. “In Bolivia, Pope Francis Apologizes for Church's 'Grave 
Sins'.” The New York Times, 
The New York Times, 10 July 2015, 
www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/world/americas/pope-francis-bolivia-catholic-church-
apology.html. 
 
 
 
 
